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Abstract. We extend the quantum-mechanical results of Muller & Saunders (2008)
establishing the weak discernibility of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in
finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces in two ways: (a) from fermions to bosons for
all finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces; and (b) from finite-dimensional to infinite-
dimensional Hilbert-spaces for all elementary particles. In both cases this is per-
formed using operators whose physical significance is beyond doubt. This confutes
the currently dominant view that (A) the quantum-mechanical description of simi-
lar particles conflicts with Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (pii);
and that (B) the only way to save pii is by adopting some pre-Kantian meta-
physical notion such as Scotusian haecceittas or Adamsian primitive thisness. We
take sides with Muller & Saunders (2008) against this currently dominant view,
which has been expounded and defended by, among others, Schro¨dinger, Margenau,
Cortes, Dalla Chiara, Di Francia, Redhead, French, Teller, Butterfield, Mittelstaedt,
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1 Introduction
According to the founding father of wave mechanics Erwin Schro¨dinger (1996: 121–122),
one of the ontological lessons that quantum mechanics (qm) has taught us is, as he told
an audience in Dublin, February 1950, that the elementary building blocks of the physical
world are entirely indiscernible:
I beg to emphasize this and I beg you to believe it: it is not a question of our being
able to ascertain the identity in some instances and not being able to do so in others.
It is beyond doubt that the question of the ‘sameness’, of identity, really and truly
has no meaning.
Similar elementary particles have no ‘identity’, there is nothing that discerns one particle
from another, neither properties nor relations can tell them apart, they are not individu-
als. Thus Schro¨dinger famously compared the elementary particles to “the shillings and
pennies in your bank account”, in contrast to the coins in your piggy-bank. In 1928, Her-
mann Weyl (1950: 241) had preceded Schro¨dinger when he wrote that “even in principle
one cannot demand an alibi from an electron”.
Over the past decades, several philosophers have scrutinised this Indiscernibility Thesis
(it) by providing various rigorous arguments in favour of it: similar elementary particles
(same mass, charge, spin, etc.), when forming a composite physical system, are indis-
cernible by quantum-mechanical means. Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity
of Indiscernibles (pii) is thus refuted by physics (qm) — and perhaps is therefore not so
metaphysical after all. This does not rule out conclusively that particles really are dis-
cernible, but if they are, they have to be discerned by means that go above and beyond
physics (qm), such as by ascribing Scotusian haecceitas to the particles, or ascribing sib-
ling attributes to them from scholastic and neo-scholastic metaphysics. Nevertheless few
philosophers have considered this move to save the discernibility of the elementary parti-
cles to be attractive — if this move is mentioned, then usually as a possibility and rarely
as a plausibility. Mild naturalistic inclinations seem sufficient to accommodate it in our
general metaphysical view of the world. We ought to let well-established scientific knowl-
edge inform our metaphysical view of the world whenever possible and appropriate, and
this is exactly what Schro¨dinger begged us to do. The only respectable metaphysics is nat-
uralised metaphysics; see further Ladyman & Ross (2007: 1–38). Prominent defenders of
it include: Margenau (1944); Cortes (1976), who brandished pii “a false principle”; Bar-
nette (1978), French & Redhead (1988); Giuntini & Mittelstaedt (1989), who argued that
although demonstrably valid in classical logic, in quantum logic the validity of pii cannot
be established; French (1989a), who assured us in the title that pii “is not contingently
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true either”; French (1989a; 1989b; 1998; 2006), Redhead & Teller (1992), Butterfield
(1993), Castellani & Mittelstaedt (2000), Massimi (2001), Teller (1998), French & Rickles
(2003), Huggett (2003), French & Krause (2006: Ch. 4).
There have however been dissenters. B.C. van Fraassen (1991) is one of them; see
Muller & Saunders (2006: 517–518) for an analysis of his arguments. We follow the
other dissenters: S.W. Saunders and one of us (Saunders (2006), Muller & Saunders
(2008)). They neither claim that fermions are individuals nor do they rely on a partic-
ular interpretation of qm. On the basis of standard mathematics (standard set-theory
and classical predicate logic) and only uncontroversial postulates of qm (notably leaving
out the projection postulate, the strong property postulate and the quantum-mechanical
probabilities), they demonstrate that similar fermions are weakly discernible, i.e. they
are discerned by relations that are irreflexive and symmetric, in every admissible state
of the composite system. So according to Muller & Saunders, the elementary building
blocks of matter (fermions) are not indiscernibles after all, contra it. They prove this,
however, only for finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces (their Theorem 1), which is a rather
serious restriction because most applications of qm to physical systems employ complex
wave-functions and these live in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space L2(R3N ); nonethe-
less they confidently conjecture that their result will hold good for infinite-dimensional
Hilbert-spaces as well (their Conjecture 1). Furthermore, Muller & Saunders (2008: 534–
535) need to assume for their proof there is a maximal self-adjoint operator acting on
finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces that is physically significant. In the case of dimension
2 of a single-fermion Hilbert-space, Pauli’s spin-1/2 operator qualifies as such a maximal
self-adjoint operator, but for higher dimensions, spin is degenerate. What this maximal
operator in those cases corresponds to they gloss over.
When it comes to the elementary quanta of interaction (bosons), Muller & Saunders
(2008: 537–540) claim that bosons are also weak discernibles, but of a probabilistic kind
(the discerning relation involves quantum-mechanical probabilities and therefore their
proof needs the Probability Postulate of qm), whereas the discerning relation of the
fermions is of a categorical kind (no probabilities involved). More precisely, the categori-
cal discernibility of bosons turns out to be a contingent matter: in some states they are
categorically discernible, in others, e.g. direct-product states, they are not; this prevents
one to conclude that bosons are categorical discernibles simpliciter. But the boson’s prob-
abilistic discernibility is a quantum-mechanical necessity; Theorem 3 (ibid.) establishes it
for two bosons, with no restrictions on the dimensionality of Hilbert-space but conditional
on whether a particular sort of operator can be found (again, a maximal self-adjoint one
of physical significance). The fermions are also probabilistic discernibles; their Theorem 2
states it for finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces only and is therefore equally restrictive as
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their Theorem 1.
The central aim of the current paper is the completion of the project initiated and
developed in Muller & Saunders (2008), by demonstrating that all restrictions in their
discernibility theorems can be removed by proving more general theorems and proving
them differently than they have done, employing only quantum mechanical operators
that have obvious physical significance. We shall then be in a position to conclude in
utter generality that all kinds of similar particles in all their physical states, pure and
mixed, in all infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces can be categorically
discerned on the basis of quantum-mechanical postulates. This result, then, should be the
death-knell for it, and, by implication, establishes the universal reign of Leibniz’s pii in
qm.
In Sections 3 and 4, we prove the theorems that establish the general result. First we
introduce some terminology, state explicitly what we need of qm, and address the issue
of what has the license to discern elementary particles (Section 2).
2 Preliminaries
For the motivation and further elaboration of the terminology we are about to introduce,
we refer to Muller & Saunders (2008: 503–505) because we follow them closely (readers
of that paper can jump to the next Section of the current paper). Here we only mention
what is necessary in order to keep the current paper comparatively self-contained.
We call physical objects in a set absolutely discernible, or individuals, iff for every
object there is some physical property that it has but all others lack; and relationally
discernible iff for every object there is some physical relation that discerns it from all
others (see below). An object is indiscernible iff it is both absolutely and relationally
indiscernible, and hence discernible iff it is discernible either way or both ways. Objects
that are not individuals but are relationally discernible from all other objects we call
relationals ; then indiscernibles are objects that are neither individuals nor relationals.
Quine (1981: 129–133) was the first to inquire into different kinds of discernibility; he
discovered there are only two independent logical categories of relational discernibility (by
means of a binary relation): either the relation is irreflexive and asymmetric, in which
case we speak of relative discernibility ; or the relation is irreflexive and symmetric, in
which case we speak of weak discernibility. We call attention to the logical fact that if
relation R discerns particles 1 and 2 relatively, then its complement relation, defined as
¬R, is also asymmetric but reflexive; and if R discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly, then its
complement relation ¬R is reflexive and symmetric but does not hold for a 6= b whenever
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R holds for a 6= b.
Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (pii) for physical objects states
that no two physical objects are absolutely and relationally indiscernible; or synonymously,
two physical objects are numerically discernible only if they are qualitatively discernible.
One can further distinguish principles for absolute and for relational indiscernibles and
then inquire into the logical relations between these and pii; see Muller & Saunders (2008:
504–505). Similarly one can distinguish three indiscernibility theses as the corresponding
negations of the Leibnizian principles. We restrict ourselves to the Indiscernibility Thesis
(it): there are composite systems of similar physical objects that consist of absolutely and
relationally indiscernible physical objects. Then either it is a theorem of logic that pii
holds and it fails, or conversely:
⊢ pii ←→ ¬it . (1)
Next we rehearse the postulates of qm that we shall use in our Discernibility Theo-
rems.
The State Postulate (StateP) associates some super-selected sector Hilbert-space H
to every given physical system S and represents every physical state of S by a statistical
operator W ∈ S(H); the pure states lie on the boundary of this convex set S(H) of all
statistical operators and the mixed states lie inside. If S consists of N similar elementary
particles, then the associated Hilbert-space is a direct-product Hilbert-space HN = H⊗
· · · ⊗ H of N identical single-particles Hilbert-spaces.
The Weak Magnitude Postulate (WkMP) says that every physical magnitude is rep-
resented by an operator that acts on H. Stronger magnitude postulates are not needed,
because they all imply the logically weaker WkMP, which is sufficient for our purposes.
In order to state the Symmetrisation Postulate, we need to define first the orthogonal
projectors Π±N of the lattice P(H
N ) of all projectors, defined as
Π+N ≡
1
N !
N !∑
pi∈PN
Upi and Π
−
N ≡
1
N !
N !∑
pi∈PN
sign(π)Upi , (2)
where sign(π) ∈ {±1} is the sign of the permutation π ∈ PN on {1, 2, . . . , N} (+1 if it
is even, −1 if odd), and where Upi is a unitary operator acting on H
N corresponding to
permutation π (these Upi form a unitary representation on H
N of the permutation group
PN ). The projectors (2) lead to the following permutation-invariant orthogonal subspaces:
HN+ ≡ Π
+
N
[
HN
]
and HN− ≡ Π
−
N
[
HN
]
, (3)
which are called the be-symmetric (Bose-Einstein) and the fd-symmetric (Fermi-Dirac)
subspaces of HN , respectively. These subspaces can, alternatively, be seen as generated
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by the symmetrised and anti-symmetrised versions of the products of basis-vectors in HN .
Only for N = 2, we have that HN− ⊕H
N
+ = H
N .
The Symmetrisation Postulate (SymP) states for a composite system of N > 2 similar
particles with N -fold direct-product Hilbert-spaceHN the following: (i) the projectors Π±N
(2) are super-selection operators; (ii) integer and half-integer spin particles are confined to
the be- and the fd-symmetric subspaces (3), respectively; and (iii) all composite systems
of similar particles consist of particles that have all either integer spin or half-integer spin
(Dichotomy).
We represent a quantitative physical property associated with physical magnitude A
mathematically by ordered pair 〈A, a〉, where A is the operator representing A and a ∈ C.
The Weak Property Postulate (WkPP) says that if the physical state of physical system
S is an eigenstate of A having eigenvalue a, then it has property 〈A, a〉; the Strong
Property Postulate (StrPP) adds the converse conditional to WkPP. (We mention that
eigenstates can be mixed, so that physical systems in mixed states can posses properties
too (by WkPP). see Muller & Saunders (2008: 513) for details.) WkPP implies that every
physical system S always has the same quantitative properties associated with all super-
selected physical magnitudes because S always is in the same common eigenstate of the
super-selected operators. We call these possessed quantitative physical properties super-
selected and we call physical systems, e.g. particles, that have the same super-selected
quantitative physical properties similar (this is the precise definition of ‘similar’, a word
that we have been using loosely until now, following Dirac).
We also adopt the following Semantic Condition (SemC). When talking of a physical
system at a given time, we ascribe to it at most one quantitative physical property
associated with physical magnitude A:
(SemC) If physical system S possesses 〈A, a〉 and 〈A, a′〉, then a = a′ . (4)
For example, particles cannot possess two different masses at the same time and (4)
is the generalisation of this in the language of qm. In other words: if S possesses
quantitative physical property 〈A, a〉, then S does not posses property 〈A, a′〉 for every
a′ 6= a. Statement (4) is neither a tautology nor a theorem of logic, but we agree with
Muller & Saunders (2008: 515) in that “it seems absurd to deny it all the same”.
Notice there is neither mention of measurements nor of probabilities in the postulates
mentioned above, let alone interpretational glosses such as dispositions.
For an outline of the elementary language of qm, we refer again to Muller & Saun-
ders (2008: 520–521). In this language, the proper formulation of pii is that physically
indiscernible physical systems are identical (Muller & Saunders 2008: 521–523):
PhysInd(a , b) −→ a = b , (5)
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where ‘a ’ and ‘b’ are physical-system variables, ranging over all physical systems, and
where PhysInd(a , b) comprises everything that is in principle permitted to discern the par-
ticles: roughly, all physical relations and all physical properties. The properties and the
relations may involve, in their definition, probabilities, in which case we call them proba-
bilistic; otherwise, in the absence of probabilities, we call them categorical. So the three
logical kinds of discernibility — (a) absolute and (r) relational, which further branches
in (r.w) weak and (r.r) relative discernibility — come in a probabilistic and a categorical
variety. In their analysis of the traditional arguments in favour of it, Muller & Saunders
(2008: 524–526) make the case that, setting conditional probabilities aside, (r) relational
discernibility has been largely overlooked by the tradition. (Parenthetically, Leibniz also
included relations in his pii because he held that all relations reduce to properties and
thus could make do with an explicit formulation of pii that only mentions properties;
give up his reducibility thesis of relations to properties and one can no longer make do
with his formulation; see Muller & Saunders (2008: 504–505).) What in particular has
been overlooked, and is employed by Muller & Saunders, are properties of wholes that are
relations between their constitutive parts: the distance between the Sun and the Earth
is a property of the solar system; the Coulomb-interaction between the electron and the
proton is a property of the Hydrogen atom; etc.
Muller & Saunders (2008: 524–528) argue at length that only those properties and
relations are permitted to occur in PhysInd (5) that meet the following two requirements.
(Req1) Physical meaning. All properties and relations, as they occur WkPP, should
be transparently defined in terms of physical states and operators that correspond
to physical magnitudes in order for the properties and relations to be physically
meaningful.
(Req2) Permutation invariance. Any property of one particle is a property of
any other; relations should be permutation-invariant, so binary relations should be
symmetric and either reflexive or irreflexive.
All proponents of the Indiscernibility Thesis (it) have considered quantum-mechanical
means of discerning similar particles that obey these two Requirements (see the references
listed in the Introduction) — and have found them all to fail. They were correct in this.
They were not correct in not considering categorical relations.
To close this Section, we want address another distinction from the recent flourishing
literature on indiscernibility and inquire briefly whether this motivates a third require-
ment, call it Req3. One easily shows that absolute discernibles are relational discernibles
by defining a relation (expressed by dyadic predicate RM ) in terms of the discerning
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properties (expressed by monadic predicate M); see Muller & Saunders (2008: 529). One
could submit that this is not a case of ‘genuine’ but of ‘fake’ relational discernibility, be-
cause there is nothing inherently relational about the way this relational discernibility is
achieved: RM is completely reducible to property M , which already discerns the particles
absolutely. Similarly, one may also object that a case of absolute discernibility implied
by relational discernibility by means of a monadic predicate MR that is defined in terms
of the discerning relation R is not a case of ‘genuine’ but of ‘fake’ absolute discernibility
(the terminology of ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ is not Ladyman’s (2007: 36), who calls ‘fake’ and
‘genuine’ more neutrally “contextual” and “intrinsic”, respectively). Definitions: physical
systems a and b are genuine relationals, or genuine (weak, relative) relational discernibles,
iff they are discerned by some dyadic predicate that is not reducible to monadic predicates
of which some discern a and b absolutely ; a and b are genuine individuals, or genuine ab-
solute discernibles, iff they are discerned by some monadic predicate that is not reducible
to dyadic predicates of which some discern a and b relationally ; discernibles are fake iff
they are not genuine. Hence there is a prima facie case for adding a third Requirement
that excludes fake discernibility:
(Req3) Authenticity. Predicates expressing discerning relations and properties must
be genuine.
In turn, a fake property or relation can be defined rigorously as its undefinability
in terms of the predicates in the language of qm that meet Req1 and Req2. In order
to inquire logically into genuineness and fakeness, thus defined, at an appreciable level
of rigour, the entire formal language must be spelled out and all axioms of qm must be
spelled out in that formal language. Such a logical inquiry is however far beyond the scope
of the current paper. Nonetheless we shall see that our discerning relations plausibly are
genuine.
But besides formalise-fobia, there is a respectable reason for not adding Req3 to our
list. To see why, consider the following two cases: (a) indiscernibles and (b) discernibles.
(a) Suppose particles turn out to be indiscernibles in that they are indiscernible by
all genuine relations and all genuine properties. Then they are also indiscernible by all
properties and all relations that are defined in terms of these, which one can presumably
prove by induction over the complexity of the defined predicates. So indiscernibles remain
indiscernibles, whether we require the candidate properties and relations to be genuine or
not.
(b) Suppose next that the particles turn out to be discernibles. (b.i) If they are
discerned by a relation that turns out to be definable in terms of genuine properties one
of which discerns the particles absolutely, then the relationals become individuals — good
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news for admirers of pii. But the important point to notice is that discernibles remain
discernibles. (b.ii) If the particles are discerned by a property that turns turns out to be
definable in terms of genuine relations one of which discerns the particles relationally, then
the individuals loose their individuality and become relationals. They had a fake-identity
and are now exposed as metaphysical imposters. But again, the important point to notice
is that discernibles remain discernibles.
To conclude, adding Req3 will not have any consequences for crossing the border
between discernibles and indiscernibles. This seems a respectable reason not to add Req3
to our list of two Requirements.
3 To Discern in Infinite-Dimensional Hilbert-Spaces
We first prove a Lemma, from which our categorical discernibility theorems then imme-
diately follow.
Lemma 1 (StateP, WkMP, WkPP, SemC) Given a composite physical system of
N > 2 similar particles and its associated direct-product Hilbert-space HN . If there are
two single-particle operators, A and B, acting in single-particle Hilbert-space H, and they
correspond to physical magnitudes A and B, respectively, and there is a non-zero number
c ∈ C such that in every pure state |φ〉 ∈ H in the domain of their commutator the
following holds:
[A, B]|φ〉 = c|φ〉 , (6)
then all particles are categorically weakly discernible.
Proof. Let a , b, j be particle-variables, ranging over the set {1 ,2 , . . . ,N } ofN particles.
We proceed Step-wise, as follows.
[S1] Case for N = 2, pure states.
[S2] Case for N = 2, mixed states.
[S3] Case for N > 2, pure states.
[S4] Case for N > 2, mixed states.
[S1]. Case for N = 2, pure states. Assume the antecedent. Define the following operators
on H2 = H⊗H:
A1 ≡ A⊗ 1 and A2 ≡ 1 ⊗ A , (7)
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where the operator 1 is the identity-operator on H; and mutatis mutandis for B. Define
next the following commutator-relation:
C(a , b) iff ∀ |Ψ〉 ∈ D :
[
Aa , Bb
]
|Ψ〉 = c|Ψ〉 , (8)
where D ⊆ H ⊗ H is the domain of the commutator. An arbitrary vector |Ψ〉 can be
expanded:
|Ψ〉 =
d∑
j,k=1
γjk|φj〉 ⊗ |φk〉 ,
d∑
j,k=1
|γjk|
2 = 1, (9)
where d is a positive integer or ∞, and {|φ1, |φ2〉, . . .} is a basis for H that lies in the
domain of the commutator [A,B]. Then using expansion (9) and eq. (6) one quickly shows
that (a = b):
[
Aa , Ba
]
|Ψ〉 = c|Ψ〉 , (10)
and that for a 6= b:
[
Aa , Bb
]
|Ψ〉 = 0|Ψ〉 6= c|Ψ〉 , (11)
because by assumption c 6= 0. By WkPP, the composite system then possesses the
following four quantitative physical properties (when substituting 1 or 2 for a in the
first, and 1 for a and 2 for b, or conversely, in the second):
〈[
Aa , Ba
]
, c
〉
and
〈[
Aa , Bb
]
, 0
〉
(a 6= b) . (12)
In virtue of the Semantic Conditional (4), the composite system then does not possess
the following four quantitative physical properties (recall that c 6= 0):
〈[
Aa , Ba
]
, 0
〉
and
〈[
Aa , Bb
]
, c
〉
(a 6= b) . (13)
The composite system possesses the property (12) that is a relation between its con-
stituent parts, namely C (8), which is reflexive: C(a ,a) for every a due to (10). Similarly,
but now using SemC (4), the composite system does not possess the property (13) that
is a relation between its constituent parts, namely C. Therefore 1 is not related to 2 ,
and 2 is not related to 1 either, because ¬C(a , b) and ¬C(b,a) (a 6= b); and then, due
to the following theorem of logic:
⊢
(
¬C(a , b) ∧ ¬C(b,a)
)
−→
(
C(a , b)←→ C(b,a)
)
, (14)
we conclude that C is symmetric (Req2). Since by assumption A and B correspond to
physical magnitudes, relation C (8) is physically meaningful (Req1) and hence is admis-
sible, because it meets Req1 and Req2.
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Further, it was just shown that the relation C (8) is reflexive and symmetric but fails
for a 6= b due to (11), which means that C discerns the two particles weakly in every pure
state |Ψ〉 of the composite system. Since probabilities do not occur in C (8), the particles
are discerned categorically.
[S2]. Case for N = 2, mixed states. The equations in (8) can also be written as an
equation for 1-dimensional projectors that project onto the ray that contains |Ψ〉:
[
Aa , Bb
]
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = c|Ψ〉〈Ψ| . (15)
Due to the linearity of the operators, this equation remains valid for arbitrary linear
combinations of projectors. This includes all convex combinations of projectors, which
exhausts the set S(H ⊗H) of all mixed states. The commutator-relation C (8) is easily
extended to mixed states W ∈ S(H ⊗ H) and the ensuing relation also discerns the
particles categorically and weakly.
[S3], [S4]. Case for N > 2, pure and mixed states. Cases [S1] and [S2] are immediately
extended to the N -particle cases, by considering the following N -factor operators:
Aj ≡ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1 ⊗ A⊗ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1 , (16)
where A is the j-th factor and j a particle-variable running over the N labeled particles,
and similarly for B(j ). The extension to the mixed states then proceeds as in [S2]. Q.e.d.
Theorem 1 (StateP, WkMP, WkPP, SemC) In a composite physical system of a
finite number of similar particles, all particles are categorically weakly discernible in every
physical state, pure and mixed, for every infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space.
Proof. In Lemma 1, choose for A the linear momentum operator P̂ , for B the Cartesian
position-operator Q̂, and for c the value −iℏ. The physical significance of these operators
and their commutator, which is the celebrated canonical commutator
[
P̂ , Q̂
]
= −iℏ1 , (17)
is beyond doubt and so is the ensuing commutator relation C (8), which we baptise the
Heisenberg-relation. The operators P̂ and Q̂ act on the infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space
of the complex wave-functions L2(R3), which is isomorphic to every infinite-dimensional
Hilbert-space. Q.e.d.
But is Theorem 1 not only applicable to particles having spin-0 and have we forgotten
to mention this? Yes and No. Yes, we have deliberately forgotten to mention this. No, it
is a corollary of Theorem 1 that it holds for all spin-magnitudes, which is the content of
the next theorem.
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Corollary 1 (StateP, WkMP, WkPP, SemC) In a composite physical system of
N > 2 similar particles of arbitrary spin, all particles are categorically weakly discernible
in every admissible physical state, pure and mixed, for every infinite-dimensional Hilbert-
space.
Proof. To deal with spin, we need SymP. The actual proof of the categorical weak
discernibility for all particles having non-zero spin-magnitude is at bottom a notational
variant of the proof of Theorem 1. Let us sketch how this works for N = 2. We begin
with the following Hilbert-space for a single particle:
Hs ≡
(
L2(R3)
)2s+1
, (18)
which is the space of spinorial wave-functions Ψ, i.e. column-vectors of 2s + 1-entries,
each entry being a complex wave-function of L2(R3). Notice that Hs is an (2s + 1)-
fold Cartesian-product set, which becomes a Hilbert-space by carrying the Hilbert-space
properties of L2(R3) over to Hs. For instance, the inner-product on Hs is just the sum of
the inner-products of the components of the spinors:
〈Ψ|Φ〉 =
2s+1∑
k=1
〈Ψk|Φk〉 , (19)
where Ψk is the k-th entry of Ψ (and similarly for Φk), which provides the norm of Hs,
which in turn generates the norm-topology of Hs, etc. The degenerate case of the spinor
having only one entry is the case of s = 0, which we treated in Theorem 1. So we proceed
here with s > 0. In particular, the number of entries 2s + 1 is even iff the particles have
half-integer spin, and odd iff the particles have integer spin, in units of ℏ.
Let ek ∈ C
2s+1 be such that its k-th entry is 1 and all others 0. They form the standard
basis for C2s+1 and are the eigenvectors of the z-component of the spin-operator Ŝz,
whose eigenvalues are traditionally denoted by m (in the terminology of atomic physics:
‘magnetic quantum number’):
Ŝzek = mkek , (20)
where m1 = −s, m2 = −s + 1, . . ., ms−1 = s− 1, ms = +s. Let φ1, φ2, . . . be a basis for
L2(R3); then this is a basis for single-particle spinor space Hs (18):{
ekφm ∈ Hs | k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2s+ 1}, m ∈ N
+
}
. (21)
Recall that the linear momentum-operator P̂ and the Cartesian position operator Q̂ on
an arbitrary complex wave-function φ ∈ L2(R3) are the differential-operator times −iℏ
and the multiplication-operator, respectively:
P̂ : DP → L
2(R3), φ 7→ P̂ φ, where
(
P̂φ
)
(q) ≡ −iℏ
∂φ(q)
∂q
(22)
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and
Q̂ : DQ → L
2(R3), φ 7→ Q̂φ, where
(
Q̂φ
)
(q) ≡ (qx + qy + qz)φ(q) , (23)
where domain DP = C
1(R3) ∩ L2(R3) and domain DQ ⊂ L
2(R3) consist of all wave-
functions ψ such that |q|2ψ(q) → 0 when |q| → ∞. The action of P̂ and Q̂ is straight-
forwardly extended to arbitrary spinorial wave-functions by letting the operators act
component-wise on the 2s + 1 components. The canonical commutator of P̂ and Q̂ (17)
then carries over to spinor space H2 (18). We can now appeal to the general Lemma 1
and conclude that the two arbitrary spin-particles are categorically and weakly discernible.
Q.e.d.
Another possibility to finish the proof is more-or-less to repeat the proof of Lemma 1
but now with spinorial wave-functions. For step [S1], the case N = 2, the state space of
the composite system becomes:
H2s ≡
(
L2(R3)
)2s+1
⊗
(
L2(R3)
)2s+1
, (24)
where the spinorial wave-functions now have (2s + 1)2 entries — (2s + 1)N for N spin-s
particles. A basis for H2s (24) is
{
ekφm ⊗ ejφl ∈ H
2
s | k, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2s+ 1}, m, l ∈ N
+
}
. (25)
An arbitrary spinorial wave-function Ψ ∈ H2s of the composite system can then be ex-
panded as follows:
Ψ(q1, q2) =
2s+1∑
k,j=1
∞∑
m,l=1
γml
(2s+ 1)
ekφm(q1)⊗ ejφl(q2) , (26)
where the γml form a squarely-summable sequence, i.e. a Hilbert-vector in ℓ
2(N), of norm 1.
With the usual definitions,
P̂1 ≡ P̂ ⊗ 1 , P̂2 ≡ 1 ⊗ P̂ , Q̂1 ≡ Q̂⊗ 1 , Q̂2 ≡ 1 ⊗ Q̂ , (27)
one obtains all the relevant commutators on H2s by using expansion (26). The discerning
relation (8) on the direct-product spinor-space H2s then becomes
C(a , b) iff ∀Ψ ∈ D :
[
P̂a , Q̂b
]
Ψ = −iℏΨ , (28)
where D ⊂ H2s is the domain of the commutator. Etc.
We close this Section with a number of systematic remarks.
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Remark 1. Notice that in contrast to the proof of Theorem 1, the proof Corollary 1
relies, besides on StateP, WkMP, WkPP and SemC, on the Symmetrisation Postulate
(SymP) only in so far as that without this postulate the distinction between integer and
half-integer spin particles makes little sense and, more importantly, the tacit claim that
this distinction exhausts all possible composite systems of similar particles is unfounded.
Besides this, SymP does not perform any deductive labour in the proof. Specifically, the
distinction between Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac states never enters the proof, which
means that any restriction on Hilbert-rays and on statistical operators, as SymP demands,
leaves the proof valid: the theorem holds for all particles in all sorts of states, fermions,
bosons, quons, parons, quarticles, anyons and what have you.
Remark 2. The proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 exploit the non-commutativity
of the physical magnitudes, which is one of the algebraic hall-marks of quantum physics.
Good thing. The physical meaning of relation C (28) can be understood as follows:
momentum and position pertain to two particles differently from how they pertain to
a single particle. Admittedly this is something we already knew for a long time, since
the advent of qm. What we didn’t know, but do know now, is that this old knowledge
provides the ground for discerning similar particles weakly and categorically.
Remark3. The spinorial wave-function Ψ must lie in the domain D of the commutator
of the unbounded operators P̂ and Q̂, which domain is a proper subspace of H2s so that
the members of H2s\D fall outside the scope of relation C (8). The domain D does however
lies dense in H2s, even the domain of all polynomials of P̂ and Q̂ does so (the non-Abelian
ring on D they generate) — D is the Schwarz-space of all complex wave-functions that
are continuously differentiable and fall off exponentially. This means that every wave-
function that does not lie in Schwarz-space can be approximated with arbitrary accuracy
by means of wave-functions that do lie in Schwarz-space. This is apparently good enough
for physics. Then it is good enough for us too.
Remark4. A special case of Theorem 1 is that two bosons in symmetric direct-product
states, say
Ψ(q1, q2) = φ(q1)φ(q2) , (29)
are also weakly discernible. This seems a hard nut to swallow. If two bosons in state
(29) are discernible, then something must have gone wrong. Perhaps we attach too much
metaphysical significance to a mathematical result?
Our position is the following. The weak discernibility of the two bosons in state (29)
is a deductive consequence of a few postulates of qm. Rationality dictates that if one
accepts those postulates, one should accept every consequence of those postulates. This
is part of what it means to accept deductive logic, which we do accept. We admit that
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the discernibility of two bosons in state (29) is an unexpected if not bizarre consequence.
But in comparison to other bizarre consequences of qm, such as inexplicable correlations
at a distance (epr), animate beings that are neither dead nor alive (Schro¨dinger’s im-
mortal cat), kettles of water on a seething fire that will never boil (quantum Zeno), an
anthropocentric and intentional concept taken as primitive (measurement), states of mat-
ter defying familiar states of aggregation (be-condensate), in comparison to all that, the
weak discernibility of bosons in direct-product states is not such a hard nut to swallow.
Get real, it’s peanuts.
Remark 5. Every ‘realistic’ quantum-mechanical model of a physical system, whether
in atomic physics, nuclear physics or solid-state physics, employs wave-functions. This
means that now, and only now, we can conclude that the similar elementary particles of
the real world are categorically and weakly discernible. Conjecture 1 of Muller & Saunders
(2008: 537) has been proved.
Parenthetically, do finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces actually have applications at all?
Yes they have, in quantum optics and even more prominently in quantum information
theory. There one chooses to pay attention to spin-degrees of freedom only and ignores
all others — position, linear momentum, energy. This is not to deny there are physical
magnitudes such as position, momentum or energy, or that these physical magnitudes do
not apply in the quantum-information-theoretic models. Of course not. Ignoring these
physical magnitudes is a matter of expediency if one is not interested in them. Idealisation
and approximation are part and parcel of science. No one would deny that quantum-
mechanical models using spinorial wave-functions in infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space
match physical reality better — if at all — than finite-dimensional models do that only
consider spin, and it is for those better models that we have proved our case.
Nevertheless, we next proceed to prove the discernibility of elementary particles for
finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces.
4 To Discern in Finite-Dimensional Hilbert-Spaces
In the case of finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces, considering Cd suffices, because every d-
dimensional Hilbert-space is isomorphic to Cd (d ∈ N+). The proof is a vast generalisation
of the total-spin relation T of Muller & Saunders (2008: 535).
Theorem 2 (StateP, WkMP, StrPP, SymP) In a composite physical system of
N > 2 similar particles, all particles are categorically weakly discernible in every physical
state, pure and mixed, for every finite-dimensional Hilbert-space by only using their spin
degrees of freedom.
14
Proof. Let a , b, j be particle-variables, ranging over the set {1 ,2 , . . . ,N } ofN particles.
We proceed again Step-wise, as follows.
[S1] Case for N = 2, pure states.
[S2] Case for N = 2, mixed states.
[S3] Case for N > 2, all states.
[S1]. Case for N = 2, pure states. We begin by considering two similar particles, labeled
1 ,2 , of spin-magnitude sℏ, which is a positive integer or a half-integer; a and b are again
variables over this set. The single particle Hilbert-space is C2s+1, which is isomorphic to
every (s2 + 1)-dimensional Hilbert-space; for N -particles the associated Hilbert-space is
the N -fold ⊗-product of C2s+1. According to SymP, when we have considered integer and
half-integer spin particles, we have considered all particles.
We begin by considering the spin-operator of a single particle acting in C2s+1:
Ŝ = Ŝx + Ŝy + Ŝz , (30)
where Ŝx, Ŝy and Ŝz are the three spin-operators along the three perpendicular spatial
directions (x, y, z). The operators Ŝ
2
and Sz are self-adjoint and commute and therefore
have a common set of orthonormal eigenvectors |s,m〉; their eigenvector-equations are:
Ŝ
2
|s,m〉 = s(s+ 1)ℏ2|s,m〉 and Ŝz|s,m〉 = mℏ |s,m〉 , (31)
where eigenvalue m ∈ {−s,−s+ 1, . . . , s− 1,+s} (see e.g. Cohen-Tannoudji et al. (1977:
Ch.X) or Sakurai (1995: Ch. 3). Next we consider two particles.
The total spin operator of the composite system is
Ŝ ≡ Ŝ1 + Ŝ2 , where Ŝ1 ≡ Ŝ⊗ 1 , Ŝ2 ≡ 1 ⊗ Ŝ , (32)
and its z-component is
Ŝz = Ŝz ⊗ 1 + 1 ⊗ Ŝz , (33)
which all act in C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1. The set
{
Ŝ1 , Ŝ2 , Ŝ , Ŝz
}
(34)
is a set of commuting self-adjoint operators. These operators therefore have a common
set of orthonormal eigenvectors |s;S,M〉. Their eigenvector equations are:
Ŝ
2
1 |s; S,M〉 = s(s+ 1)ℏ
2 |s; S,M〉 ,
Ŝ
2
2 |s; S,M〉 = s(s+ 1)ℏ
2 |s; S,M〉 ,
Ŝ
2
|s; S,M〉 = S(S + 1)ℏ2 |s; S,M〉 ,
Ŝz |s; S,M〉 = Mℏ |s; S,M〉 .
(35)
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One easily shows that S ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2s} and M ∈ {−S,−S + 1, . . . , S − 1, S}.
We note that every vector |φ〉 ∈ C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1 has a unique expansion in terms of
these orthonormal eigenvectors |s;S,M〉, because they span this space:
|φ〉 =
2s∑
S=0
+S∑
M=−S
γ(M,S)|s; S,M〉 , (36)
where γ(M,S) ∈ C[0, 1] and their moduli sum to 1. Since the vectors |s;m,m′〉 ≡
|s,m〉 ⊗ |s,m′〉 also form a basis of C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1, so that
|φ〉 =
+s∑
m=−s
+s∑
m′=−s
α(m,m′; s)|s; m,m′〉 , (37)
where α(m,m′; s) ∈ C[0, 1] and their moduli sum to 1, these two bases can be expanded
in each other. The expansion-coefficients α(m,m′; s) of the basis-vector |s;S,M〉 are the
well-known ‘Clebsch-Gordon coefficients’. See for instance Cohen-Tannoudji (1977: 1023).
Let us now proceed to prove Theorem 2. Consider the following categorical ‘Total-spin
relation’:
T(a , b) iff ∀ |φ〉 ∈ C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1 :
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
|φ〉 = 4s(s+ 1)ℏ2 |φ〉 . (38)
One easily verifies that relation T (38) meets Req1 and Req2.
We now prove that relation T (38) discerns the two fermions weakly.
Case 1 : a = b. We then obtain the spin-magnitude operator of a single particle, say
a :
(
Ŝa + Ŝa
)2
|s; S,M〉 = 4Ŝ
2
a |s; S,M〉 = 4s(s+ 1)ℏ
2 |s; S,M〉 , (39)
which extends to arbitrary |φ〉 by expansion (36):
(
Ŝa + Ŝa
)2
|φ〉 = 4s(s+ 1)ℏ2 |φ〉 . (40)
By WkPP, the composite system then possesses the following quantitative physical
property (when substituting 1 or 2 for a):
〈
4Ŝ
2
a , 4s(s+ 1)ℏ
2
〉
. (41)
This property (41) is a relation between the constituent parts of the system, namely T
(38), and this relation is reflexive: T(a ,a) for every a due to (40).
Case 2 : a 6= b. The basis states |s; S,M〉 are eigenstates (35) of the total spin-
operator Ŝ (32):
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
|s; S,M〉 = S(S + 1)ℏ2 |s; S,M〉 , (42)
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which does not extend to arbitrary vectors |φ〉 but only to superpositions of basis-vectors
having the same value for S, that is, to vectors of the form:
|s; S〉 =
+S∑
M=−S
γ(M,S)|s; S,M〉 . (43)
Since S is maximally equal to 2s, the eigenvalue S(S + 1) belonging to vector |s;S〉 (43)
is always smaller than 4s(s + 1) = 2s(s + 1) + 2s, because s > 0. Therefore relation T
(38) fails for a 6= b for all S:
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
|s; S,M〉 6= s(s+ 1)ℏ2 |s; S,M〉 . (44)
The composite system does indeed not possess, by SemC (4), the following two quan-
titative physical properties of the composite system (substitute 1 for a and 2 for b or
conversely):
〈(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
, s(s+ 1)ℏ2
〉
, (45)
which is expressed by predicate T as a relation between its constituent parts, 1 and 2 ,
because the system does possess this property according to WkPP:
〈(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
, S(S + 1)ℏ2
〉
. (46)
However, superpositions of basis-vectors having a different value for S, such as
1√
2
(
|s; 0, 0〉+ |s; 1,M〉
)
, (47)
where M is −1, 0 or +1, are not eigenstates of the total spin-operator (32). Precisely
for these states we need to appeal to StrPP, because according to the converse of WkPP
this is sufficient to conclude that the composite system does not possess physical property
(45), so that also for these states relation T(a , b) fails for a 6= b. From this fact and
the theorem of predicate logic (14), we then conclude that T is symmetric (Req2). Since
the operators involved correspond to physical magnitudes, e.g. spin, relation T (38) is
physically meaningful (Req1) and hence is admissible, because it also meets Req2 (T is
reflexive and symmetric).
Therefore total-spin-relation T (38) discerns the two spin-s particles weakly. Since no
probability measures occur in the definiens of T; it discerns them also categorically.
[S2]. Case for N = 2, mixed. The extension from pure to mixed states runs as before,
as in step [S2] of the proof of Lemma 1. There is however one subtle point we need to
take care of.
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Case 1 : a = b. Rewriting relation T (38) for 1-dimensional projectors is easy. Since
the spin s of the constituent particles is fixed, the 1-dimensional projector that projects
on the ray that contains |s; S,M〉 is an eigenoperator (eigenstate) of (Ŝa + Ŝa)
2 having
the same eigenvalue 4s(s + 1) (39). Consequently, every (convex) sum of 1-dimensional
projectors that project on vectors with the same value of S has this same eigenvalue and
we proceed as before in [S2] of Lemma 1, by an appeal to WkPP and a generalisation of
T (38) to mixed states:
T(a , b) iff ∀W ∈ S(C2s+1 ⊗ C2s+1) :
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
W = 4s(s+ 1)ℏ2W . (48)
For (convex) sums of projectors that project on vectors of different value of S, we need
StrPP again, as in step [S1] above. Relation T(a ,a) (48) holds also for mixed states.
Case 2 : a 6= b. The 1-dimensional projector on |s;S,M〉 now is an eigenoperator
(eigenstate) of
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
having eigenvalue S(S + 1)ℏ2 (35). Since S 6 2s for every S,
this eigenvalue is necessarily smaller than 4s(s + 1) for all S. Then either every convex
mixture of the 1-dimensional projectors has an eigenvalue smaller than 4s(s + 1) too, or
it is not an eigenstate of
(
Ŝa + Ŝb
)2
at all (when the mixture consists of projectors on
different states |s;S,M〉 and |s;S ′,M ′〉, S 6= S ′). In virtue of StrPP, relation T (38) then
does not hold for its parts (for a 6= b), for all states, mixed and pure, because the system
does not possess the required physical property.
So T (48) is reflexive and symmetric (Req2) and certainly physically meaningful
(Req1). In conclusion two similar particles in in every finite-dimensional are categori-
cally weakly discernible in all admissible states, both pure and mixed.
[S3]. Case for N > 2, all states. Consider a subsystem of two particles, say a and
b, of the N -particle system. We can consider these two to form a composite system and
then repeat the proof we have just given, in [S1] and [S2], to show they are weakly and
categorically discernible. When we can discern an arbitrary particle, say a , from every
other particle, we have discerned all particles. Q.e.d.
We end this Section again with a few more systematic remarks.
Remark 1. In our proofs we started with N particles. Is it not circular, then, to prove
they are discernible because to assume they are not identical (for if they were, we would
have single particle, and not N > 1 particles), implies we are somehow tacitly assuming
they are discernible? Have we committed the fallacy of propounding a petitio principii?
No we have not. We assume the particles are formally discernible, e.g. by their labels,
but then demonstrate on the basis of a few postulates of qm that they are physically
discernible. Or in other words, we assume the particles are quantitatively not-identical
and we prove they are qualitatively not-identical. Or still in other words, we assume
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numerical diversity and prove weak qualitative diversity. See further Muller & Saunders
(2008: 541–543) for an elaborate discussion of precisely this issue.
Remark 2. Of course Theorem 1 implies probabilistic versions. The Probability Pos-
tulate (ProbP) of qm gives the Born probability measure over measurement outcomes
for pure states and gives Von Neumann’s extension to mixed states, which is the trace-
formula. By following the strategy of Muller & Saunders (2008: 536–537) to carry over
categorical proofs to probabilistic proofs, one easily proves the probabilistic weak discerni-
bility of similar particles, notably then without using WkPP and SemC (4).
Remark 3. In contrast to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 relies on StrPP, which arguably is an
empirically superfluous postulate. StrPP also leads almost unavoidably to nothing less
than the Projection Postulate (see Muller & Saunders 2008: 514). Foes of the Projection
Postulate are not committed to Theorem 2. They will find themselves metaphysically in
the following situation (provided they accept the whiff of interpretation WkPP): similar
elementary particles in infinite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces are weakly discernible, in cer-
tain classes of states in finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces they are also weakly discernible,
fermions in finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces are weakly discernible in all admissible states
when there always is a maximal operator of physical significance (see Introduction), but
for other classes of states in finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces the jury is still out.
For those who have no objections against StrPP, all similar particles in all kinds of
Hilbert-spaces in all kinds of states are weakly discernible. This may be seen as an
argument in favour of StrPP: it leads to a uniform nature of elementary particles when
described quantum-mechanically and the proofs make no distinction between fermions
and bosons.
Remark 4. The so-called Second Underdetermination Thesis says roughly that the
physics underdetermines the metaphysics — the First Underdetermination Thesis then
is the familiar Duhem-Quine thesis of the underdetermination of theory by all actual
or by all possible data; see Muller (2009). Naturalistic metaphysics, as recently has
been vigorously defended by Ladyman & Ross (2007: 1–65), surely follows scientific
theory wherever scientific theory leads us, without prejudice, without clinging to so-called
common sense, and without tacit adherence to what they call domesticated metaphysics.
Well, qm leads us by means of mathematical proof to the metaphysical statements (if they
are metaphysical) that similar elementary particles are categorical (and by implication
probabilistic) relationals, more specifically weak discernibles. Those who have held that
qm underdetermines the metaphysics in this regard (see references in the Introduction),
in this case the nature of the elementary particle, are guilty of engaging in unnatural
metaphysics (for elaboration, see Muller (2009: Section 4)).
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5 Conclusion: Leibniz Reigns
We have demonstrated that for every set SN of N similar particles, in infinite-dimensional
and finite-dimension Hilbert-spaces, in all their physical states, pure and mixed, similar
particles can be discerned by physically meaningful and permutation-invariant means,
and therefore are not physically indiscernible:
QM− ⊢ ∀N ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, ∀a , b ∈ SN : a 6= b −→ ¬PhysInd(a , b) , (49)
where QM− now stands for StP, WkMP, StrPP and SymP, which is logically the same as
having proved pii (5):
QM− ⊢ ∀N ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, ∀a , b ∈ SN : PhysInd(a , b) −→ a = b , (50)
and by theorem of logic (1) as having disproved it. Hence
QM− ⊢ pii ∧ ¬it . (51)
Therefore all claims to the contrary, that qm refutes pii, or is inconsistent with pii, or
that pii cannot be established (see the references in Section 1 for propounders of these
claims) find themselves in heavy weather. Quantum-mechanical particles are categorical
weak discernibles, and therefore not indiscernibles as propounders of it have claimed.
Similar elementary particles are like points on a line, in a plane or in Euclidean space:
absolutely indiscernible yet not identical (there is more than one of them!). Points on a
line are categorical relationals, categorical weak discernibles to be precise. Elementary
particles are exactly like points in this regard.
Leibniz is back from exile and reigns over all quantum-mechanically possible worlds,
salva veritate.
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